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Against Harassment in the name of Dowry U/s.498(A)

    • Allegations Against Sister-In-Laws: Insulting and making derogatory remarks does not fall U/s.498(A) IPC - RAMESH VS. STATE OF TAMIL NADU (3/3/2005) -Supreme Court of India
      Certain acts of taunting and ill-treatment of informant by her sister-in-law (appellant) were alleged but they do not pertain to dowry demand or entrustment and misappropriation of property belonging to the informant. What was said against her in the F. I. R. is that on some occasions, she directed the complainant to wash W. C. and she used to abuse her and used to pass remarks such as "even if you have got much jewellery, you are our slave. " It is further stated in the report that Gowri would make wrong imputations to provoke her husband and would warn her that nobody could do anything to her family. These allegations, even if true, do not amount to harassment with a view to coercing the informant or her relation to meet an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security. At the most, the allegations reveal that her sister-in-law gowri was insulting and making derogatory remarks against her and behaving rudely against her. Even acts of abetment in connection with unlawful demand for property/dowry are not alleged against her. The bald allegations made against her sister-in-law seem to suggest the anxiety of the informant to rope in as many of the husband's relations as possible. Neither the F.I.R. nor the charge-sheet furnished the legal basis to the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offences alleged against the appellant Gowri Ramaswamy. The High court ought not to have relegated her to the ordeal of trial. Accordingly, the proceedings against the appellant Gowri ramaswamy are hereby quashed and her appeal stands allowed.
    • Rope in Relatives in Dowry Harassment Cases and Dowry Death Cases - KANS RAJ VS. STATE OF PUNJAB (26/4/2000) - Supreme Court of India:
      For the fault of the husband, the in-laws or the other relations cannot, in all cases, be held to be involved in the demand of dowry. In cases where such accusation are made, the overt acts attributed to persons other than husband are required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. By mere conjectures and implications such relations cannot be held guilty for the offence relating to dowry deaths. A tendency has, however, developed for roping in all relations of the in-laws of the deceased wives in the matters of dowry deaths which, if not discouraged, is likely to affect the case of the prosecution even against the real culprits. In their over enthusiasm and anxiety to seek conviction for maximum people, the parents of the deceased have been found to be making efforts for involving other relations which ultimately weaken the case of the prosecution even against the real accused as appears to have happened in the instant case.(para 5)
    • Compoundable if compramise - THATHAPADI VENKATALAKSHMI VS. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH (27/7/1990) - High Court of A.P.:
      Though in the instant case, the wife made a report to the police regarding the cruelty meted out to her at the hands of her husband, the parties had some reconciliation, there were talks for settlement, and there was agreement between the spouses to lead a harmonious matrimonial life. Since the basic object of any matrimonial law is to facilitate a happy and harmonious matrimonial life between the spouses though under different circumstances they approached the Court the permission sought for to compound the offence u/s. 498- A IPC pursuant upon the settlement and understanding between the spouses to amicably live together with harmony can be accorded by this Court u/s. 482 Cr. P. C Keeping, therefore, in view the larger interests of the parties and to secure the ends of justice the Court below is directed by exercising powers u/ S. 482 Cr. P. C. to accord permission to compound the offence after examining the parties in Court and after satisfying about the voluntary nature of the settlement and the consequent filing of the petition in question for purposes of compounding the offence. Para.5.
    • Compoundable if compromise either for divorce or for re-union - DAGGUPATI JAYALAKSHMI VS. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH (23/6/1993) - High Court of A.P.:
      We are of the firm view that in matrimonial cases, that too, in exceptional circumstances where the disputes arose between the wife and husband resulting in filing a complaint and a petition for divorce which ultimately resulted in the form of compromise either for divorce or for re-union, and where some of the sections complained of are Compoundable and some non-compoundable, the High Court alone is competent, exercising the inherent power vested in it under section 482 Cr. P. C. to permit the parties to compound a non-compoundable offence along with other compoundable offences, after being satisfied with the compromise entered into between the parties. The Magistrate or the Sessions Judge, who are not having inherent powers, have no power to accord permission to compound a noncompoundable offence. The application for compounding a non-compoundable offence can be filed by either of the parties to the compromise before the High Court.
    • Compoundable if both parties agree to live separate by taking divorce - T. CHANDA PAPA RAO VS. STATE (4/1/2002) - High Court of A.P.:
      TO give one more example, the dispute is settled between the parties and both the parties are satisfied that they cannot live as wife and husband any more and both of them take wise decision to separate from each other, the proper provision is made by the husband for the maintenance of the wife, the matrimonial relations between the parties are put to an end by the competent Court of Civil jurisdiction. In that event also the husband cannot be made to face a drama of facing trial under Section 498-A IPC. Whatever the examples given by us, they are not exhaustive but they are only illustrative. Therefore, we are of the considered view that depending upon the facts of each case, the High Court can exercise the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. PC to meet the ends of justice and to stop the abuse of process of law. Reference made by the learned single Judge is answered accordingly. Para 16.
    • Where Couple cannot live together and come to conclusion - MANDA VIKRAM DEV VS. M. SUPRIYA (23/1/2006) - High Court of A.P.:
      IN the instant case also both the spouses are young and highly qualified. If they have to fight like cocks in a Court of law for years together they would certainly lose their valuable years of life particularly youth-hood. They have reached a stage where they cannot live together. Allegations and counter allegations are being made. They decided to take divorce. If more valuable part of life is lost it is difficult for them to get remarried. Denying to quash the proceedings would not serve any purpose when the criminal proceedings launched against the husband are going to end in acquittal in view of the compromise. To allow the police to file charge-sheet in crime No. 224 of 2005 and to allow the proceedings in the above said crimes to go on, would ultimately result in futile exercise, wasting the valuable time of the police, the Court and the parties as well. Therefore, in the aforesaid circumstances, i feel it is expedient in the interest of justice to quash the proceeding in all the three cases. Para 27.
    • High Court can quash the petition - B. S. JOSHI VS. STATE OF HARYANA (13/3/2003) - Supreme Court of India:
      ( 13 ) THE observations made by this Court, though in a slightly different context, in G. V. Rao v. L. H. V. Prasad and Ors. 1 are very apt for determining the approach required to be kept in view in matrimonial dispute by the courts, it was said that there has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commissions of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arraigned as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their "young" days in chasing their "cases" in different courts.
      ( 14 ) THERE is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing section 498a in the Indian Penal Code was to prevent the torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498a was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The hyper-technical view would be counter productive and would act against interests of women and against the object for which this provision was added. There is every likelihood that nonexercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XXA of Indian penal Code.
      ( 15 ) IN view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under section 482 of the Code.
    • Neither Police nor Court can Impound the Passport - SURESH NANDA VS. C. B. I. (24/1/2008) -Supreme Court of India
      ( 15 ) IN our opinion, even the Court cannot impound a passport. Though, no doubt, section 104, Cr. P. C. states that the Court may, if it thinks fit, impound any document or thing produced before it, in our opinion, this provision will only enable the Court to impound any document or thing other than a passport. This is because impounding a "passport" is provided for in section 10 (3) of the Passports Act. The Passports act is a special law while the Cr. P. C. is a general law. It is well settled that the special law prevails over the general law vide G. P. Singh's Principles of Statutory interpretation (9th Edition pg. 133 ). This principle is expressed in the maxim "generalia specialibus non derogant". Hence, impounding of a passport cannot be done by the Court under Section 104, Cr. P. C. though it can impound any other document or thing.
    • Police cannot seize passport U/s.102 Cr.P.C. arbitrarily : S. SATHYANARAYANA VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA (24/1/2003) - Karnataka High Court.
      IN this case, the I. O. who conducted raid seized certain properties including the Passport of the petitioner and his wife which is neither the subject of theft nor seizure of the Passport has created any suspicion of the commission of offence. The offences alleged against the petitioner are forgery and misappropriation of funds. Possessing a Passport is not an incriminating circumstance at all. This Court has already enlarged the petitioner on bail and has imposed certain stringent conditions. Therefore, the seizure of Passport in this case is not legal though the police officer has power to seize any property subject to the provisions of S. 102, Cr. P. C. The trial Judge is not right in rejecting the request of the petitioner for return of Passport. Hence, the order of the trial Magistrate rejecting the prayer of the petitioner for return of Passport is not sustainable in law. Para 18.

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